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NOTES
Missed Opportunity? The Affirmation of the Death
Penalty in the AEDPA: Extradition Scenarios
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States cannot ignore the issue of terrorism. Besides continued attacks
around the world,' the United States must now contend with the fact of internal terror-
ism. The United States still mourns the domestic terrorist bombing of Oklahoma City
and the Olympic Games explosion, as well as the Unabomber attacks.2 Events like
these push the populous of America to demand a response from the government to do
something in furtherance of the fight against terrorism at home and abroad. In response
to the public pressure Congress passed the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996' (AEDPA), which expanded an unwise death penalty policy.4 The
AEDPA extended death penalty eligible crimes to encompass terrorist acts that tran-
scend the United States' national boundaries. The continued expansion is directly at
odds with policy of the rest of the western hemisphere5 and ultimately will lead to in-
creased conflict and hostility in the future regarding extraditions to the United States.
This Note does not pose an easy solution to the problem of extradition and the death
penalty, because if there was one, it would already be law. Instead, due to the complex
nature of the issue, the Note focuses on bringing to light the problem, specifically the
imposition of the death penalty to terrorists' acts abroad, and proposes a long-term
goal of abolishing the death penalty. The actions taken by Congress in response to
public rage may have been good politics, but the extension of the death penalty is not
sound policy.
The AEDPA was approved by both Houses of Congress and signed by the Presi-
dent in April of 1996.6 President Clinton proposed the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act
of 1995, which was aimed at international terrorism.7 Most of his suggested legislation
was incorporated into the AEDPA,s along with provisions addressing domestic terror-
1. See Sage R. Knauft, Note, Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed State
Responses to Terrorist Attacks, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & CoM. L. REV. 763, 766 (1996).
2. See Rick Vernier, Land of the Free, Home of Terror, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, August 4, 1996,
at 31.
3. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered of 18 U.S.C.A.) (West Supp. 1997).
4. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(b) (West Supp. 1997)).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. Approved by the Senate on April 17, 1996 and the House of Representatives on April 18,
1996. Supra note 3. The bill was signed into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996. Statement
on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 32 WEEKLY COMi'. PRES. Doc. 719
(April 24, 1996).
7. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 32 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 719 (April 24, 1996).
8. Id.; President's Remarks on American Security in a Changing World at George Washington
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ism that transcended national borders.9 The final AEDPA was expediently pushed
through Congress so that there would be confirmed remedial legislation before the one
year anniversary of the Oklahoma bombing."
H. JURISDICTION OVER TERRORIST ACTS
Before delving into the death penalty aspects of the legislation, the first issue of
concern is Congress' ability to prescribe legislation over terrorist acts that occur out-
side the United States. This area is governed by international law regarding extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction." Jurisdictional guidelines set forth in treaties between nations and
adherence to accepted international standards of conduct generally assist in maintaining
international peace with respect to extradition scenarios. Extraterritorial jurisdiction
necessarily touches on issues of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states,
which are cornerstones of international law.
The United States' Restatement of Foreign Relations allows for the creation of
laws that affect the interests of another state only if the promulgation and enforcement
of these laws falls within one of its recognized forms of prescriptive jurisdiction as set
forth in § 402 and § 404 of the Restatement.2 International law recognizes various
forms of jurisdictional principles including nationality,13 territoriality, 4 passive per-
sonality, 5 protective," and universality. 7 The most widely accepted justifications
for extraterritorial jurisdiction.in international law are the territoriality and the national-
ity principles.' Territoriality confers power onto a state to prescribe laws within its
own boundaries, while nationality acknowledges prescription over nationals wherever
they are located. 9 Neither of these principles cover extraterritorial acts, i.e. acts com-
mitted by non-nationals against United States nationals outside the United States'
University, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1404 (Aug. 5, 1996).
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(b) (West Supp. 1997).
10. See Elizabeth Shogren, Senate OKs $-Billion Anti-Terrorism Measure, L.A. TIMES, April 18
1996, at 1.
11. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the ability to bring an individual into the jurisdiction of a nation
even though the individual did not commit the crime within that jurisdiction, nor is the individual
necessarily a national of that jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402
(1987).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 states:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of person, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed
against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
Id.
13. See I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (11th ed. 1994).
14. Id.
15. Passive personality jurisdiction is assumed by the state of which the injured is a national. Id.
at 210.
16. Protective principle states that a state may exercise jurisdiction over crimes against its security
or national interests. Id. at 211.
17. Universality permits all states to apprehend and punish offenders of such crimes that are con-
trary to the interests of the international community. An example of such a crime is piracy. Id. at 212.
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, PL V, Ch. 1, Subch. A, introductory note (1987).
19. See SHEARER supra note 13, at 208.
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boundaries.
Previously, the United States prosecuted terrorist acts against nationals through
its participation in multilateral conventions such as the Tokyo Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts, Committed While on Board Aircraft" and the Organization
of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking
the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortions that are of International
Significance.2 These conventions were set up among nations to deal with specific,
enumerated terrorist acts. The general use of terrorism to cover a wide range of acts
has not been workable because of little international agreement on the definition of
terrorism. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,22 the first
statute to address this extraterritorial issue, went beyond the reach of any of these con-
ventions to cover acts against American nationals abroad that were not specifically
enumerated in the conventions. So long as a United States national was a victim, the
United States could prosecute under its laws, according to this act. Beyond territoriality
and nationality principles, prescriptive jurisdiction is vaguely defined in international
law. It becomes even more nebulous when extradition of a suspect is involved because
the nations participating must be convinced that the requesting state has a justifiable
claim to jurisdiction. 3
For the AEDPA to be legitimate under international law and enforced through
the cooperation of the international community, the jurisdictional basis must be valid
and the international community willing to support it. There is debate on the precise
justification the United States put forth in support of its extension of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.24 Although numerous authors have asserted alternative justifications, the
consensus is the passive personality principle is the most appropriate.' The United
States has the official policy of only performing extraditions with nations that have
established reciprocal treaties with the United States. 6 The 1986 extension of extra-
territorial jurisdiction, combined with the 1994 reinstatement of the death penalty for
terrorist acts' makes the granting of an extradition request all the less likely.
20. Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts, Committed While on Board Aircraft,
September 14, 1963, 20 U.T.S. 2941.
21. Organization of American States Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism
Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortions that are of International Signifi-
cance, February 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949. See also Knauft supra note 1, at 768.
22. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat.
853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (1994).
23. See generally Patrick Donnelly, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed
Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 599
(1987).
24. See Brandon S. Chabner, The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986:
Prescribing and Enforcing United States Law Against Terrorist Violence Overseas, 37 UCLA L. REV.
985, 991 (June 1990) (asserting that the main basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Act is the
protective principle); Donnelly, supra note 23 at 599-607 (stating the statute bases its jurisdiction on
the passive personality principle and the universality theory); lAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE PRINCI-
PLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1994); Jon C. Cowen, Note, The Omnibus Diplomatic
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986: Faulty Drafting May Defeat Efforts to Bring Terrorists to
Justice, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127 (988) (arguing the Act was based solely on the passive personali-
ty principle).
25. See supra note 24.
26. M. CHERIF BAssiouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADMON: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 49
(3d ed. 1996).
27. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1997). Although S. 1798 proposed the death penalty for the terrorist murder of United States
102 ' Journal of Legislation [Vol. 24:99
III. EXTRADITION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Assuming that the United States believes it is justified in exercising jurisdiction
over the crime on prescriptive grounds, the next hurdle is getting the nation, where the
defendant is found, to surrender the suspect. Even if the jurisdictional basis is valid
under international law, the host nation may find reason not to extradite the suspect.
Under international law, the modem understanding is that, in absence of a treaty, there
is no duty on the host nation to prosecute or hand over the suspect. 2 Rather, it is
deemed to be an imperfect obligation, only having the force of international law when
there is a compact committing the parties to extradition via a contract-like situation.29
However, even when there is an extradition treaty, nations may deny extradition if the
treaty allows refusal based on the death penalty3° or if there is a conflict among trea-
ties regring the duty to extradite." The AEDPA ca only continue to jeopardize the
likelihood of the foreign country handing over the suspect because of its affirmation
and extension of the death penalty in the realm of international extraditions of terror-
ists.
The United States federal statutes had not imposed the death penalty to any
crimes since 197232 until the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." The Violent Crime
Control Act of 19943" introduced the death penalty for international terrorist acts com-
mitted against United States nationals abroad,35 and the AEDPA of 1996 has sought
to broaden the implementation of the death penalty to include terrorism that transcends
national boundaries and shorten habeas corpus petitions. Our country's increasing use
of the death penalty will hinder the likelihood of bringing terrorists to justice because
this trend is at direct odds with the international community's trend towards the aboli-
tion of the death penalty.36 If the legislature had taken the opportunity to assess the
international climate, they would have seen the wisdom behind imposing a mandatory
nationals abroad, it died in the House Judiciary Committee after passing the Senate in 1989. The
House-Senate conference killed it. Although it was H.R. 4032 that was finally incorporated into the
Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, discussion around S. 1798 encompasses the main debate on the
issue in Congress and will be referenced throughout this Note.
28. BAssiouNi supra note 26 at 5-6 (stating that contemporary practice reflects this point of view
with respect to common criminality but, with respect to international criminality, the trend has favored
the view that there is a definite duty on nations to extradite persons accused of serious crimes); see
also Mark W. Janis, INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 348-50 (2d ed. 1993). Strong support for
the modem view by Brownlie, who stated, "with the exception of alleged crimes under international
law, in the absence of a treaty, surrender of an alleged criminal cannot be demanded as of right." IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (1990) (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. In 1989, the United States had twenty extradition treaties in operation that held that the other
nation could deny extradition if there was a possibility the suspect will face the death penalty in the
United States. The nations having those treaties with the United States at the time were Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. 135
CONG. REc. S14205-06, S14214 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding the death penalty in violation of the 8th
and 14th Amendments).
33. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 848 (1994) (reinstating use of the death penalty);
135 CONG. REc. S579-01, 5614 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter).
34. Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
35. Id.
36. See generally WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1993).
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life sentence.37 Current law permits the sentence for convicted terrorist acts against
United States nationals abroad to range from a fine up to capital punishment." Man-
datory life imprisonment would instead guarantee that the defendant stand trial in the
United States."
IV. INTERNATIONAL VIEWS ON EXTRADITION AND THE DEATH
PENALTY
The Government acknowledges that terrorism is an international problem that
requires cooperation among nations.' The most fundamental considerations when
drafting legislation on terrorism should be international judicial decisions, treaties, and
customary international law. In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights decided a
pivotal case in international law pertaining to extradition and international human
rights. Soering v. United Kingdom4' dealt with a young German man who had es-
caped from the United States after he and his girlfriend killed her parents. The couple
fled to England, where they were arrested for passing bad checks.42 While the girl-
friend negotiated with prosecutors, the man, Jens Soering, fought extradition to the
United States. The murders took place in Virginia and at the time, the crime was death
penalty eligible. As to the request to extradite Mr. Soering according to the Extradition
Treaty of 1972,'3 the British government wanted assurances that the death penalty
would not be sought.' The United States agreed to pass on to the sentencing judge
the statement that the United Kingdom did not want the death penalty to be avail-
able.' Mr Soering protested the extradition to the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg, France. Mr. Soering argued under Article Three of the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' that his pos-
sible punishment if extradited would equal degrading and inhuman conduct, and possi-
bly even torture. Furthermore, he argued that if the death penalty or the process await-
ing the death penalty was identified as degrading or inhuman, that the United Kingdom
had an affirmative duty as a signatory of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms not to place Mr. Soering in a position
where he would be in jeopardy of facing such treatment.'
The court decided the issue, not on the death penalty itself, but rather on expo-
sure to the death row phenomenon,' a possible form of psychological torture, would
37. See 135 CONG. REC. S14260-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield regard-
ing his suggested amendment to S. 1798 which proposed a mandatory life sentence without the pos-
sibility of parole for the terrorist killing of a U.S. national abroad).
38. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
39. See supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., Warren P. Strobel, Clinton Urges UN to Fight Crime, Terror Talk Addresses U.S.
Skeptics, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at Al.
41. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063
(1989).
42. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1072.
43. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 (entered into force Jan. 21, 1977).
44. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1073.
45. Id. at 1073.
46. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, states, "No one shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment." Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
47. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1091-93.
48. The death row phenomenon is a form of psychological torture experienced by people incar-
cerated for long durations pending execution. See Daniel P. Blank, Mumia Abu-Jamal and the "Death
19981
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make the extradition a breach of Article Three of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights.49 Although not reaching the requisite level of torture,'
the court concluded that the prospect of waiting for execution for six to eight years
was degrading and inhuman.5 The court agreed with Mr. Soering that the United
Kingdom had a duty to protect him from being placed in a position where such action
was a possibility.52 Moreover, the court stated that the prosecutor for the United
States' original recommendation to the American judge was not sufficient, especially
since the prosecutor admitted that he wanted to seek the death penalty." The court
considered the options available and decided it would be best to extradite Mr. Soering
to his homeland of Germany for prosecution of the crime with no threat of the, death
penalty being imposed.54
The proponents of the AEDPA presumably would assert that habeas corpus re-
forms ls......n .any p death row phenomenon. While the changes are likely to
cause the death penalty to be carried forth more quickly, the situation created is less
than ideal. There is still ostensibly a long duration when the individual on death row is
waiting for execution and the procedural short cuts may infringe on several valued
human rights such as the prohibition on cruel and inhuman treatment and the right to a
fair trial. The possible shortened length of time on death row and the effect of that on
the death row phenomenon in all probability would not persuade the international
community to accept the death penalty.5
The United States has a history of swaying in its position on the death penal-
ty.' The question used to be whether it was just or moral. The death penalty has
been held to be constitutional57 and now the question seems to be how quickly the
sentence of death can be executed. The United States' stance on the death penalty
receives little support from other western nations"s and "more than half the world's
states are now abolitionist either de jure or de facto, and almost all of them have taken
this step since WWII." '59 The Soering case clearly indicates the reality that the United
States' jurisprudential stance on the death penalty has been drifting away from the rest
of the western world. We are now the only western nation that carries out the death
Row Phenomenon," 48 STAN. L. REv. 1625 (1996) (reviewing MUMIA ABU-JAMAL, LIVE FROM DEATH
Row (1995)).
49. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1096-97.
50. Id., 28 I.L.M. at 1097-1100.
51. Id. at 1100.
52. Id. at 1093-1101.
53. Id. at 1095 (informing the sentencing judge that the wishes of the United Kingdom do not
eliminate the possibility of the death penalty).
54. Id. at 1100. At the end of the day, the United States finally assured the Biitish Government
that no capital murder charges would be brought against Mr. Soering. So, he was eventually extradited
to the United States in 1991. See Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradi-
tion: The Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845, 872 (1990).
55. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERI-
CA 178-81 (1987); WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMiENT & TORTURE 8-11
(1996); SCHABAS, supra note 36, at 6-22.
56. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding the death penalty to be arbitrary and capri-
cious, therefore unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment); Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (approving state efforts regarding the death penalty and deeming it constitutional under a bi-
furcated proceeding).
57. Gregg, 425 U.S. at 153.
58. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 55, at 178-89.
59. SCHABAS, supra note 55, at 9.
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penalty for ordinary crimes.' International agreements around the globe condemn the
death penalty.6 The United States, while being a signatory" to many of these orga-
nizations, has always reserved the right to decide on the imposition of the death penal-
ty.' Even though the Supreme Court has applied the Eighth Amendment concept of
cruelty to the death penalty and found the punishment not to be cruel, in situations
such as international extradition, the evolving standards of decency test" should apply
the international community's standards as was the case in Thompson v. Oklahoma.65
Also, the argument against the death penalty as violating the right to life has not been
fully addressed in the international community. If our goal is to make extradition effec-
tive and to prosecute terrorist offenders, the United States must look to international
standards and realize the death penalty is an outdated form of punishment and no
longer accepted.
The two most pervasive justifications for the death penalty are retribution and
deterrence.' No one can deny that the limited retributive aspect may be valid so long
as the execution is performed on the individual which the community feels was guilty.
The deterrent aspect has never been established67 and is much less convincing when
dealing with terrorist acts,' but this is the justification given in support of the legisla-
tion by Congress. Senator D'Amato argued how imposing the death penalty for terror-
ist acts would send a powerful message to terrorists around the world and deter future
acts.' But, terrorists are people who would give their lives for their cause; death is a
price they are willing to pay and they are not likely to be deterred by the thought of
dying. In fact, the belief in dying for the cause is heroic to many and a community
may make a martyr of the person executed. The death penalty is unlikely to convince
possible terrorists not to follow through with their plan. Therefore, retribution is the
only viable justification for the death penalty for terrorists. However, that rationale is
not defensible if the death penalty is what keeps the United States from prosecuting
the suspect.
60. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 55, at 228-30.
61. See American Convention on Human Rights (1979) 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Protocol No. 6 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of
the Death Penalty, E.T.S. 114; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil &
Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 44 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 49 at 206, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989) (ratified July 11, 1991).
62. Signatory is a term used in diplomacy to indicate a nation which is a party to a treaty.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1381 (6th ed. 1990). Under the Vienna Convention on Treaties, Article 18,
a signatory nation can do nothing to defeat the object and purpose of signed treaties. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 55, at 178.
63. SCHABAS, supra note 36, at 92.
64. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The evolving standards of decency test was applied
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
65. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (referring to international viewpoints in
applying the death penalty to juveniles).
66. ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY 180 (1996).
67. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT RESEARCH (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991).
See also HOOD, supra note 66, at 210-12.
68. In order for the theory of deterrence to be valid a rational person will not commit a crime if
the severity of the punishment for the criminal act and the perceived certainty of receiving punishment
outweigh the benefits of the illegal conduct. Franklin E. Zimring & Michael Laurence, Death Penalty,
in DEATH PENALTY (Amnesty International ed. 1995).
69. 135 CONG. REc. S14227-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
Journal of Legislation
V. ENFORCING EXTRADITION
As is evident by this Note, the main problem pertaining to the death penalty in
this context arises when a nation has a terrorist within its borders and refuses to extra-
dite the individual to the United States because it knows the law permits the imposition
of the death penalty. Although issues like this should be dealt with in the extradition
treaty between the United States and the other nation, adherence to the treaty is not
always guaranteed. Additionally, the United States has treaties permitting refusal. °
The nation may not want to extradite the individual even if the United States promises
not to impose the death penalty, or more likely, if the United States is unwilling to
make such a promise. One of the solutions to this type of extradition problem in the
past has been international abduction.7'
The recent case of United States v. Alvarez-Machai 72 is an example of an ab-
duction of a suspect in order to enforce United States' laws against an individual. In
Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national was forcibly kidnapped and brought to the Unit-
ed States to stand trial for participating in kidnapping and murdering a drug enforce-
ment agent.73 Although the district court held that it did not have proper jurisdiction
over the individual because there was a violation of the Extradition Treaty between the
United States and Mexico74 and the appeals court upheld the decision,75 the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed and remanded.76 The Supreme Court held that the
Extradition Treaty did not prohibit abduction outside of its terms, and general princi-
ples of international law did not imply terms into the Treaty that an abduction, such as
what occurred, was prohibited.77 Thus, the district court did have jurisdiction to try
the Mexican national who was forcibly kidnapped and brought within its jurisdiction.
The United States Constitution permits Congress and the Executive to act in
violation of international law.7" However, at the same time, the Executive branch is
constitutionally restricted to act according to its own treaty until the treaty is voided or
suspended.79 Because of the governing nature of the treaty, in order for the United
States courts to have jurisdiction without violating the Constitution, the act of state-
70. See supra note 30.
71. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp.
896 (D.D.C. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that the mode of
acquiring jurisdiction over a Lebanese man suspected in relation to a hijacking was not relevant to the
prosecution under the federal district court's law; the suspect was lured into international waters by the
FBI and forcibly arrested and brought back to the United States).
72. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
73. Id. at 557.
74. United States v. Cara-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affld sub nom,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Extradi-
tion Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656 (entered into force on Jan.
25, 1980).
75. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1467.
76. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670.
77. Id. at 663-70.
78. Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 746, 751 (Oct. 1992) (stating that the violation of international law by
an act of Congress does not render that act invalid under United States domestic law). See also The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
79. The United States Constitution confers power upon the Executive to enter into treaties. At the
same time, these treaties are binding upon the government as Article VI states, "[AIIl Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land." U.S. CONST. arL VI, cl. 2.
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sponsored abductions must not violate the treaty between the two respective nations.
It is unlikely that the treaty will expressly grant the authority to abduct a terrorist
from within another's borders, therefore, the courts must determine the legality through
interpretation of the treaty. The Ker-Frisbie rule is a court-initiated doctrine that deals
with this type of situation in United States law. With its foundation in the decisions of
Ker v. Illinois' and Frisbie v. Collins,8 the rule states the general proposition that a
United States court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant in a criminal case, re-
gardless of the manner in which the defendant was brought within the court's territori-
al jurisdiction.82 Although the validity of the Ker-Frisbie rule was doubted prior to
Alvarez-Machain,"3 the decision confirmed it as valid under current United States
law. 4
There are two conflicting views as to the purpose of extradition treaties. The
majority in Alvarez-Machain advocated that the only purpose of these treaties is to
impose mutual obligations to surrender fugitives of justice. 5 This rationale was in-
voked to back up the claim that the United States did not violate the treaty in Alvarez-
Machain' and for further extension of the Ker-Frisbie rule. The dissent argued the
more appropriate definition under international law that the purpose of extradition
treaties is a reduction of conflicts arising when a fugitive takes refuge within another
nation's borders." This justification for extradition treaties recognizes the importance
of acknowledging territorial integrity of other nations and the sovereignty of its gov-
ernment in controlling the affairs of its land by implying a duty not to abduct an indi-
vidual within the foreign nation's borders." With this interpretation, abduction would
be a violation of the treaty if it was not pre-approved or approved following the abduc-
tion."'
80. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (determining that the abduction of a citizen of Lima to
stand trial for larceny was not a violation of due process).
81. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (addressing the forcible abduction from one state to
another, concluding that it would not be a denial of due process in a later conviction proceeding).
82. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally
Keith Highet & George Kahale I, International Decisions: Criminal Jurisdiction-Extradition Treaties-
U.S. Government-Sponsored Abduction of Mexican Citizen, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 811 (1992).
83. See generally United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
84. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-62 (1992) (expanding the scope of the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine to encompass state-sponsored kidnapping in violation of customary international
law). In order to be customary international law, factors to be considered are duration, uniformity and
generality of practice, as well as opinio juris. Although this is not currently the case with regard to
the death penalty, the trend indicates it soon may be. BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 5-7. Opinio juris
is a concept that the practice is required by or consistent with prevailing international law. Id. at 7.
In Ker v. Illinois, the kidnapper was not a state agent, but rather a Pinkerton security guard. The
differences between the two cases are worthy of investigation, but are not within the scope of this
Note. See Charles Biblowit, Comment, Transborder Abductions and United States Policy: Comments on
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 9 NY INr'L L. REv. 105 (1996).
85. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 664.
86. Id. With this reasoning, there was no violation because there was no obligation on the United
States to refrain from abduction.
87. Id. at 672 n.4.
88. One of the most fundamental principles of international relations is territorial integrity of a
sovereign nation, as embodied in Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,
Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
607, as well as provisions of the United Nations Charter, June 26, 1946, 59 Stat 1031, T.S. No. 993.
The United States is a signatory of both documents.
89. See Biblowit, supra note 84.
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The Alvarez-Machain decision invited much criticism from around the world.'
The decision appeared to be in blatant violation of international law. The United States
has previously recognized the importance of national sovereignty in its decisions.9' In
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court declared that congressional
legislation should not be interpreted in violation of customary international law if there
were any other interpretation available.' Notwithstanding the high regard given to na-
tional sovereignty and international law in the past, the Court conceded the possibility
that it was violating accepted international principles when it reversed the lower courts'
decisions and conferred jurisdiction over Mr. Alvarez-Machain.93
Although the courts of the United States permitted the state-sponsored abduction
of a criminal and granted jurisdiction, in the area of law dealing with extradition, co-
operation in an international setting is the key to effectiveness. By following intema-
tional standards of conduct, the United States would show it is cooperating with other
nations and working towards achieving justice in all countries, instead of bucking
against the international community. State-sponsored abduction's repudiation of inter-
national norms may jeopardize our future relations with nations and encourage harbor-
ing of suspected terrorists. If our courts support state-sponsored abductions, those
decisions may set a precedent that undermines the motivation for other nations to make
treaties with the United States. Although the economic and political influence of the
United States is powerful, our policies do not lend to cooperation and can defeat the
goal of prosecuting suspected terrorists in the United States' court system. By adhering
to international customs, decisions, and its own extradition treaties, the United States
increases the likelihood of bringing international terrorists to justice and, in this pro-
cess, protecting its own national security.94
VI. PROPOSAL
Any retributive justification for capital punishment is severely undermined when
the suspect cannot even be extradited to the United States. Senator Mitchell was cor-
rect in stating, "the Senate is being asked to consider legislation on the basis of a
slogan instead of a reason," when the Senate considered the proposal for the death
penalty for the terrorist murder of United States nationals abroad in 1989." Besides
90. Among those voicing disapproval are the New York Times, the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee of the Organization of American States, and numerous other nations, including Mexico. See
Biblowit, supra note 84. See also Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in Amer-
ican Courts-Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention By Foreign Defen-
dant Kidnapped Abroad By U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L.REv 1401, 1512 n.454 (1996) (discussing
the outrage of Mexicans and disapproval voiced by Canada, Colombia, and numerous other nations).
91. Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), wherein Chief Justice
Marshall declared, "[tihe jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute." See also Biblowit, supra n6 te 84, at 108. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (holding
that extradition treaties prohibit government-authorized kidnapping of individuals from the jurisdiction
of one of the signatories for the purpose of trying the individual in the courts of the other signatory;
the Court acknowledged that a nation may, however, consent to the removal of the individual from its
territory outside the formal procedures of the extradition treaty after the fact, by failing to protest to
the kidnapping).
92. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
93. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992). See also Biblowit, supra note
84, at 108.
94. Biblowit, supra note 84, at 115 (arguing that respecting international law and treaty obliga-
tions facilitates international cooperation in defeating terrorism).
95. 135 CONG. REC. S14227-01 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitchell during the
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the political and emotional appeal of the legislation based on the slogan of sending a
message to terrorists, the legislation is detrimental to the prosecution of terrorists, thus,
counterproductive to its aims.
The AEDPA expands the terrorist crimes eligible for the death penalty. A man-
datory life sentence without the possibility of parole would be a more effective solu-
tion. Instead of leaving a jury to decide the punishment for a convicted terrorist, which
could range from a fine to the sentence of death, a mandatory life sentence guarantees
a life sentence in jail without the possibility of parole." As put forth convincingly by
Senator Levin, this measure would be more effective and tougher than the possible re-
tributive benefit of death because of the certainty of severe punishment.97 There are
extradition treaties in place with nations that will not extradite because of the death
penalty possibility." The United States has to promise not to seek the death penalty
when dealing with these nations in order for the extradition to come to fruition and this
weakens the Government's strength and effectiveness. Instead of the emotive death
penalty for terrorists as set forth in the AEDPA and its predecessors, Congress should
consider its effectiveness and amend the statute in favor of a mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole.
Even though the focus of this Note is on terrorist acts resulting in the death of a
United States nationals abroad, the issue is not fully addressed until dealing with the
event of a domestic terrorist who flees. If the above stated policy was limited only to
terrorist murders of United States nationals abroad, the end result would be inconsis-
tent and consequently unfair. Terrorists who commit their crimes domestically and then
flee may still have the death penalty brought against them, an occurrence that will in-
voke the AEDPA legislation or state law that may implement the death penalty." If
the criminal does not flee, the crime could be death penalty eligible. However, if the
same crime was committed abroad and a national was killed, the terrorist would not
likely be subjected to the death penalty. This appears to be an inconsistent application
of the law and arguably, a favorable disposition for those who flee. Although a manda-
tory life sentence is not seen by some as the more favorable alternative, the inconsis-
tency of the death penalty's application must be addressed.
One way to address the issue is to handle it on a case-by-case basis. Under that
understanding, whenever the situation arises when the terrorist is abroad, the United
States enters into negotiations with the other nation. If the nation demands that the
death penalty not be imposed, then the United States may promise not to pursue it in
order to prosecute the defendant.'"
This proposed solution does not address the main inconsistency. Even though
there may not be any debate between the United States and the other nation regarding
the death penalty in some situations, the nations that do oppose it will demand that the
United States not enforce the death penalty. Under that circumstance, the inconsistency
is not overcome. Once terrorists reach a nation that prohibits the death penalty, they
original debate on the imposition of the death penalty for terrorist murders of United States nationals
abroad).
96. See supra note 37.
97. See 135 CONG. REc. S14205-06 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin).
98. See supra note 30.
99. Fairness issues arising from different punishments under federal and state laws is beyond the
scope of this Note.
100. As was the case in Soering, 28 IL.M. 1063.
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are within a safe haven and it is likely that they will either not be prosecuted or the
United States will promise not to seek the death penalty. If it does not seek the death
penalty for terrorists that manage to get into one of such nations, then the maximum
punishment for the same crime will vary. Even though the law is the same, if the
suspect gets abroad, the probable sentence imposed is not.
Another proposal to the problem of inconsistency is taking the underlying argu-
ment of this Note to its final conclusion that the United States should abolish the death
penalty. As noted, the international community is heading towards this consensus. °1
The Soering case indicates that the European Court of Human Rights finds the death
row phenomenon is in violation of Article Three of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."°e Moreover, many interna-
tional agreements, such as the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,10 3 Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,' 4 and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights' Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica"W expressly state that actions
should be undertaken towards abolishing the death penalty. The United Nations Gener-
al Assembly declared that it was desirable to restrict the number of offenses for which
the death penalty might be imposed, with a view towards abolishing the death penalty
entirely.16
Removing the possibility of the death penalty with regard to international crimes,
such as terrorism, is the first step in reaching a solution to this complex international
criminal issue. There is no easy solution to the extradition problem manifest in terrorist
crimes and the abolition of the death penalty may not be supported by the majority of
the public." 7 But, sometimes sound public policy trumps a referendum vote.
Susan M. McGarvey*
101. See supra Part IV.
102. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3,
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